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This paper revisits the relation between democracy, liberalization, and prosperity in transition 
countries, using a panel of 25 countries over 19 years. Earlier investigations found political and 
economic liberalization to be positively correlated whereas the relation between political 
liberalization and prosperity remained unclear. In this paper, a hump-shaped relationship between 
political liberalization and growth is found, such that a rise in democracy levels promotes growth only 
under initially low democracy levels. Furthermore, economic and political liberalization turn out to be 
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1.  Introduction  
In a certain way, the formerly socialist countries of Middle and Eastern Europe as well as 
the former Soviet Union represent a natural experiment on the question as to whether 
economic reforms are more likely to be successful when performed by either authoritarian or 
democratic governments. Each of these countries started out with more or less strictly anti-
democratic governments, and each of these countries was as far from a western-type market 
economy as a country could be.
1 It is therefore no wonder that the effects of democratization 
on the respective government’s reform capacity became one of the most prominent topics in 
the debate around timing and sequencing of transition processes. Most of the later EU 
members democratized first and then immediately embarked on a rather consistent process of 
market reforms. The more we move to the east, however, the more countries we find which 
are more hesitant with respect to both the process of democratization and that of market 
reforms. In south-east Asia, however, there is still another variant, namely that of China and, 
to certain extent, also Vietnam. Here, the communist rulers remained in place and even 
officially retained the Marxist ideology while at the same time they installed genuine 
capitalist structures, which resulted in startling growth, but also in exorbitant inequality. 
Within Middle and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we can by now find all 
sorts of governmental structures, ranging from western-type full-fledged democracies to 
presidential dictatorships. The question as to whether the structure of political systems has 
influenced the speed and consistency of market reforms and also prosperity in the post-
socialist countries has been addressed occasionally but not with conclusive results. Most of 
the literature on this topic goes back to the 1990s and early 2000s. This paper revisits the 
relation between democracy on the one hand and prosperity in terms of per capita growth in 
 
1 Some minor differences were certainly present, especially in Poland, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia, 
but that does not revise the principle.     3
                                                
GDP as well as reform capability on the other, using a panel data set of 25 formerly socialist 
countries that ranges from 1989 to 2007.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relation of democracy and prosperity in general and with 
respect to formerly socialist countries is given. In the third section, the data panel is described 
and some descriptive statistics are presented. The relation between the degree of democracy 
and per capita growth is investigated in section four, and the relation between democracy and 
reform capability is explored in section five. Section six concludes.  
2. Relating Democracy and Prosperity in the Literature: Theory and Empirical Findings 
Somewhat roughly, we can split the theoretical literature on our topic in two branches 
(Glaeser et al., 2004). In one branch democracy is assumed to have the character of a 
consumption good, presumably exhibiting positive income elasticity (Minier, 2001). As far as 
democracy has a negative elasticity of substitution with respect to other material and non-
material consumption goods, it comes at a cost in terms of foregone alternative consumption 
of goods and services.
2 In the other branch, democracy is characterized as an investment good 
or, put differently, an input of the macroeconomic production function. Here, it provides some 
politico-institutional preconditions for prosperity, thus raising productivity of the other factors 
of production.  
Concerning the first branch there are three major lines of reasoning on the question as to 
why democracy may reduce overall efficiency. First of all, democracy may reduce the degree 
of governmental autonomy as compared to autocracy. One may think of this to be true almost 
by implication. However, things are slightly more complex as will be seen below. Secondly, 
 
2 To a certain extent, Lipset’s (1959) famous modernization hypothesis is an early version of this branch of 
the literature.   4
democracy reduces the rate of time preference in policy making. Given a usual income 
distribution, the median voter’s income and wealth is below average which motivates him to 
ask for redistributive politics. This, in turn, allocated resources away from investment and into 
consumption, resulting in lower rates of growth under the assumptions of new growth theory 
(Alesina/Rodrik, 1994; Persson/Tabellini, 1994; Parente, 2006). The third line of reasoning 
rests on incentives for postponing reform measures in order to gain scope for more favorable 
distributive positions. The latter is even possible in the case of strictly Pareto improving 
reform programs when the respective group interests happen to structure themselves into the 
preconditions of a war of attrition game. This applies when each party has a positive expected 
value of the difference between the gains from redistribution forced by way of postponing a 
reform on the one hand and the losses in personal income growth in the case of an actually 
postponed reform (Alesina/Drazen, 1991).  
Whereas all three lines of reasoning have their appeal they may also be subject to severe 
objections, even that of being a nirvana approach (Demsetz, 1969). This is so since the 
alternative to democracy is all but immune against special interests and struggles for 
redistribution. Like democratic governments, the leaders of dictatorships are restricted in their 
activities by a threat of being removed from office by way of violence. The fact that this 
threat stems from revolutions and coups rather than from elections does not means that it is 
not associated with struggles for redistribution (Tullock, 1971; 1987; Acemoglu/Robinson, 
2006;  Besley/Kudamatsu, 2007). However, the restrictions for democratic and autocratic 
governments, respectively, are certainly of different types and so may be the resulting effects 
on redistribution, efficiency, and reform capability. Hence, any analysis requires comparative 
institutional approaches in order to identify effects of some political and constitutional order 
as compared to some other.   5
                                                
In a number of papers, Olson
3 has analyzed the incentive structure of governments in both 
dictatorships and democracies. As a starting point, he has distinguished from each other what 
he has called stationary bandits and roving bandits, respectively. Consider a geographic 
region comprising of a certain number of scattered settlements. As long as the region has no 
centralized protective-state structure in Buchanan’s (1975) sense, there is Hobbesian anarchy 
across the settlements. Roving bandits would then have an incentive to move from one 
settlement to another and rob each of them up to the point where marginal “revenue” from 
each settlement becomes zero. For the most part, this means to leave no intact structure 
behind. As the number of not yet robbed-out settlements decreases, the incentive for roving 
bandits to become stationary rises. To that end, they can define personal spheres of interests in 
terms of certain sub-regions, use force in order to keep competing bandits from intruding and 
focus on seizing resources from the inhabitants of “their” region alone. They may also call 
their booties taxes and claim legitimacy as kings or emperors.  
The point here is that stationary bandits have an incentive to keep the structure of “their” 
region intact and to spend some of their booties (or taxes) for investments in infrastructure, or 
even education and health. Hence, dictatorship may be superior to anarchy in terms of 
welfare. However, as long as there are rents from a position of king, stationary bandits will 
have to spend a part of these rents for redistributive purposes as well. This is so since they 
will have to please potential challengers which might otherwise want to replace the 
incumbents by themselves. Then, the difference between dictatorship and democracy is that, 
in the former, rents have to be distributed to relatively small but potentially threatening groups 
who may organize coups. Democratic governments, by contrast, have to please a majority 
rather than some narrow elites. This, in turn, makes democracies superior to dictatorship in 
Olson’s view.  
 
3 See, e.g., Olson (1991); Olson/McGuire (1996).    6
Wintrobe (1998) distinguishes pure personal-welfare maximizing “tin-pot dictators” from 
ideologically motivated totalitarian dictators. Whereas the latter are more or less incalculable 
by nature, the formers’ propensity to pursue reform programs rests, inter alia, on their rate of 
time preference. Hence we can expect the young king of a stable hereditary monarchy to be 
more reform oriented than a military dictator who faces the threat of a coup any time. While 
the king is much of a stationary bandit, we would expect the military dictator to behave more 
like a roving bandit in Olson’s terms.  
Based on Olson’s reasoning Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) analyze under what conditions 
democratic or autocratic governments may be expected to pursue welfare enhancing reform 
programs. Unfortunately, there is no general answer on that. Rather, it is conditional on 
certain parameter values. Moreover, even if these values were known in advance, this would 
be of mere academic interest since it is practically impossible to set some dictator in office 
and commit him on pursuing some sort of economic reforms. Any such commitment would 
not be credible unless each future reform step would be in the dictator’s personal interest at 
the time it is to be decided upon. Apart from such a case, one could credibly commitment a 
dictator only by way of retaining the ultimate sources of power in order to remove him from 
office whenever he should fail to deliver on his reform promise. That, however, would mean 
to deprive a dictator of the very instruments that make him a dictator in the first place. Finally, 
there is no answer on who may legitimately retain the ultimate sources of power and to decide 
on whether or not to maintain the dictator’s appointment. There is clearly an infinite regress in 
legitimation here. As a result, there may well be dictatorships that happen to face incentives 
for pursuing efficiency-enhancing reforms. And there are clearly empirical examples of that. 
However, that does not imply the feasibility of a strategy of deliberately enthroning a dictator 
conditional on his obligation to exploit his alleged extra degrees of freedom for pursuing 
consistent economic reforms.    7
Summing up, a dictatorship may happen to be a good economic reformer, but so does a 
democracy. Neither form of government has a univocal advantage with respect to economic 
reforms from the point of view of mere theoretical considerations. Moreover, even if 
authoritarian governments had indeed a broader scope of governmental discretion, it would 
still face the problem that a dictator cannot credibly be committed to a certain (reform) policy 
for reasons of a dictatorship’s very nature.   
Turning to the empirical analysis of the relation between political systems and economic 
prosperity, the picture is again mixed at best. Even when relating the level of, instead of 
growth in, per-capita income to the degree of democracy, the results are less clear than it 
seems at first glance. While there is indeed a close correlation between democracy and per-
capita income on a world-wide basis, this correlation may be misleading for a number of 
reasons, such as endogeneity problems and those of unobserved variables (Decker/Lim, 2007; 
Acemoglu et al. 2008).  
When it comes to growth in per-capita income, things are even less clear. As early as in 
1993, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) surveyed 18 empirical papers on the relation between 
democracy and growth. In eight papers, significantly higher growth rates have been found in 
countries with dictatorships or bureaucratic-authoritarian governments as compared to 
democracies; in five cases, it was the other way round, and in two cases there was no 
significant difference at all. An early survey by Sirowy and Ingles (1990) brought similar 
results. In a widely recognized paper, Barro (1996) found a hump shape of the influence of 
democracy on growth in a panel comprising of approximately 100 countries: Growth tended 
to accelerate with the degree of democracy up to a certain maximum but slowed down with 
higher degrees of democracy. However, his results were only partly significant. Rivera-Batiz 
(2002) estimated the influence of democracy and good governance on total factor productivity 
within a framework of new growth theory. He found that democracy significantly influenced 
total factor productivity, but only as long as indicators of good governance were omitted from   8
his regressions. Upon inclusion of good-governance indicators the coefficients for the 
democracy indicator turned insignificant. 
Mulligan et al. (2000) tested the influence of democracy on some more specific policy 
instruments. Apart from those policy instruments which are directly related to securing 
political monopoly in dictatorships they did find practically no significant relation between 
democracy and measures of economic and social policy. More generally, findings on a 
positive relation between institutional quality and economic performance (e.g. by Knack and 
Keefer, 1995, or by Hall and Jones, 1999) have severely been criticized by Glaeser et al. 
(2004), and mainly for two reasons: Firstly, they present evidence that the direction of 
causality may run from high income to democracy rather than the other way round, and they 
secondly criticize the construction of the most common indicators since, in their view, these 
indicators do not represent deep institutional structures but rather pretty volatile policy 
choices.  
Some authors studied the effect of regime changes, rather than the state of a regime, on 
growth. Although effects of democratization on growth and other performance indicators 
reported by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) tended to be positive, they were generally not very 
robust. Minier (1998) found a significantly negative effect of a switch from democracy to 
dictatorship, but not the other way round. Destruction of democracy hence reduced growth but 
democratization did not raise growth. In a related paper, Minier (2003) explored the effect of 
democracy movements on growth. In a shorter period of five years the emergence of such a 
movement reduced growth when governments made major concessions. As far as a 
government made only minor concessions or completely suppressed the revolt without 
concessions there were no or slightly negative effects. In the longer run of a ten-year period 
only the negative effect on growth in the case of major concessions remained significant. The 
author herself, however, cautioned against too far reaching conclusions, not least because 
many of the more recent democracy movements, e.g. in the formerly socialist countries, have   9
not been included in her study. Persson (2005) argues that a democracy-autocracy duality 
may be too rough in order to identify politico-institutional structures which determine 
welfare-enhancing or reducing policy strategies. He thus explores switches from dictatorship 
to different types of democracy, namely presidential or parliamentary systems and those with 
proportional representation as compared to those with majority rules. Rodrik and Wacziarg 
(2005) studied countries that democratized and then remained democratic for at least a five 
years period. They found a positive impact of democratization on growth. Persson and 
Tabellini (2007) report similar evidence. In both cases, however, the results are not always 
significant.  
When turning to the post-socialist countries, the empirical basis is much weaker. It has 
early been recognized that there is a positive correlation between the degree of 
democratization and that of economic liberalization in those countries 
(Åslund/Boone/Johnson, 2001; Dethier/Ghanem/Zoli, 1999). In line with that, Metelska-
Szaniawska (2009) found a positive influence of constitutional quality on reform progress in 
post-socialist countries. Although these findings are compatible with the general literature on 
the relation between democracy and liberalization (see, for example, de Haan/Sturm, 2003; 
Rigobon/Rodrik, 2005; Pitlik, 2008), the evidence for the post-socialist countries is still based 
on just a few investigations, most of which are not very recent.  
Moreover, when turning to the further relation, namely the one between liberalization and 
growth, the evidence is still less conclusive. Albeit a number of authors have claimed a 
positive influence of that kind (De Melo/Denzier/Gelb, 1996; Fischer/Sahay/Végh, 1996; 
Åslund/Boone/Johnson, 2001), their results have been put in doubt by others. Specifically, 
Krueger and Ciolko (1998) as well as Heybey and Murrell (1999) criticized that repercussions 
from growth back to the level of liberalization had not been taken account of. Fidrmuc (2003) 
hence used instrument variables but still found a significant influence of the (estimated) 
degree of liberalization on growth for most of the periods under investigation.    10
Fidrmuc (2003) also found a tentatively positive influence of democracy on growth. 
However, that influence survived only as long as liberalization was omitted from the 
estimation. Upon inclusion of economic liberalization the coefficient of the democracy index 
turned negative and/or was insignificant. In order to check for a possible indirect influence of 
democracy on growth via liberalization, he applied a two-step estimation strategy. In the first 
step, he estimated the degree of liberalization, using democracy as regressor, and in the 
second step, he estimated growth as the dependent variable, using democracy as well as the 
residuals from the first step as regressors. He thus effectively included only that part of 
liberalization into the growth estimation which appeared uncorrelated with the democracy 
indicator. The effect is that the influence on growth stemming from that part of liberalization 
that can, in turn, be attributed to democratization will be shifted to the coefficient of the 
democracy index. As a result, the latter coefficient turned positive in all but one period, and in 
two out of seven periods, the coefficient was even significantly positive, albeit only on a 10-
percent level.  
However, this strategy may be questionable. First of all, it requires all potential control 
variables to be omitted from the first-step regression in order to exclude influences of factors 
other than democracy on the degree of liberalization. This, however, gives rise to an omitted-
variable bias that distorts the measured influence of democracy on liberalization (in our case it 
most probably overstates it). Secondly, including only the residuals of liberalization from the 
first-step estimation into the regression on growth has, in principle, the same effect as 
omitting the liberalization index altogether, since the residuals of liberalization are 
uncorrelated with the democracy index. The biased coefficient that we have when we omit 
liberalization altogether will thus reappear through the omission of all but the democracy 
index in the first-step of the two-step estimation strategy. It is thus not surprising that the 
coefficients in both regressions are pretty similar, which applies particularly to those which 
are significant. These objections imply that the regressions do not provide reliable indications   11
                                                
for a growth-promoting effect of democracy in the post-socialist countries (nor do they 
suggest the opposite, though). This view is supported by those regressions in Fidrmuc (2003) 
which embodied both the democracy and the liberalization index, since the results of these 
were either insignificant or, as in one case, even significantly negative. In sum, we do as yet 
not have any reliable indication on how democracy may have impacted economic reform and 
prosperity in the formerly socialist countries, if at all. Hence I will revisit that question in the 
remainder of this paper. 
3. Empirical Framework and Descriptive Statistics 
For the purpose of my investigation, I use a panel consisting of data on 25 formerly 
socialist countries from Middle and Eastern Europe (MOEL) as well as the former Soviet 
Union, and Mongolia, ranging from 1989 to 2007. Prosperity is measured by the growth rate 
of real gross domestic product per capita. For measuring democracy, two different indicators 
are used. One is a non weighed average of the political rights (PR) and the civil rights (CR) 
indicator, as presented by Freedom House
4 on an annual basis. The original indicators range 
from one to seven, where seven indicates the lowest and one the highest degree of either 
political rights or civil liberties. Additionally, I use the Polity IV index
5 which is based on two 
scales, one of which indicates the level of autocracy and the other the level of democracy. 
Both indices range from zero to nine, with zero indicating the lowest and nine the highest 
respective level. The Polity IV index, then, is the sum of the democracy index minus the 
autocracy index. I have rebased both indices such that a value of one indicates the lowest and 
10 the highest respective degree of democracy. In the following tables, the rebased average of 
the political rights and civil liberties index by Freedom House is referred to as the FH index. 
 
4 See Freedom House (various issues); see also: www.freedomhouse.org 
5 See www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf for a detailed description.   12
                                                
Likewise, the rebased Polity IV (or simply Polity) index will be referred to as the POL index. 
Although the respective methodology behind the two indicators is different, the Freedom 
House and Polity indicators are closely correlated. For our sample, the correlation coefficient 
is 0.89 (t=41.5). Since the statistical properties of the two indicators are nevertheless different 
from each other and since both indicators are widely used, I tested the influence of both 
variables on the respective endogenous variable throughout the paper.  
For measuring economic reform progress I used the economic liberalization index by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Like the democracy indices 
this index is also commonly used in the analysis of transition countries. The EBRD index 
measures the degree of economic liberalization in the formerly socialist countries of Middle 
and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia. It consists of 14 partial 
indicators, ranging from privatization over price and foreign-trade liberalization to 
infrastructure reform.
6 Like in the case of the Freedom House index I took the non-weighed 
average of all partial indicators and rebased it such that a value of 1 is associated with a 
complete centralization of the economy (a centrally planned economy) whereas a value of 10 
indicates a full-fledged market economy with the highest degree of economic liberalization.  
In line with standard economic growth theory I have included a number of most common 
control variables, namely per capita GDP and investments as well as governmental spending 
in percent of GDP. Furthermore, I also tried different indicators for human capital 
endowment. Probably due to reliability of these data within a panel data setting of the 
countries under investigation, all these indicators turned out to be insignificant, so I dropped 
them from the panel. Table 1 gives a descriptive overview of the institutional indices as well 
as of per capita GDP by country for an early and also for a more recent period.  
 
6 See EBRD (various issues); see also www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.  
years 92-95 04-07 92-95 04-07 92-95 04-07 92-95 04-07
Albania 6.4 7.3 8.2 9.1 3.7 6.4 0.3 0.6
Armenia 6.4 4.6 8.2 8.2 2.8 7.3 3.1 12.3
Azberbaijan 2.8 3.7 4.6 2.8 1.9 5.5 -21.6 20.3
Belarus 5.5 1.9 8.2 2.8 2.8 3.7 -10.4 9.7
Bulgaria 8.2 9.1 9.1 10 4.6 8.2 1.6 6.7
Croatia 5.5 8.2 3.7 9.1 4.6 8.2 -0.1 4.6
Czech Republic 9.1 10 10 10 7.3 9.1 2.6 5.5
Estonia 8.2 10 8.2 8.2 6.4 10 1.3 8.2
Hungary 9.1 10 10 10 7.3 10 1.4 3.6
Kazakhstan 3.7 3.7 3.7 2.8 2.8 7.3 -9.3 8.3
Kyrgyz Republic 6.4 4.6 4.6 6.4 4.6 6.4 -15.3 3.4
Latvia 7.3 10 9.1 9.1 5.5 9.1 0.2 10.5
Lithuania 8.2 10 10 10 5.5 9.1 -7.6 8.2
Macedonia, FYR 6.4 7.3 8.2 10 4.6 7.3 -4.1 4.1
Moldova 4.6 6.4 8.2 9.1 3.7 6.4 -13 6.6
Mongolia 8.2 8.2 10 10 3.7 6.4 0.3 7.5
Poland 9.1 10 9.1 10 7.3 9.1 5 5.4
Romania 5.5 8.2 8.2 10 3.7 8.2 4.3 6.6
Russian Federat. 6.4 3.7 7.3 8.2 4.6 7.3 -8.8 7.4
Slovak Republic 7.3 10 9.1 10 6.4 9.1 2.3 7.3
Slovenia 9.1 10 10 10 5.5 8.2 4 4.9
Tajikistan 1 3.7 2.8 4.6 1.9 4.6 -19.9 6.4
Turkmenistan 1 1 1.9 1.9 1 1.9 -12.3 11.9
Ukraine 6.4 7.3 8.2 8.2 2.8 6.4 -17.7 7.8
Uzbekistan 1 1 1.9 1.9 2.8 4.6 -4.9 6.3
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Delelopment; Freedom House; Polity IV Project; World 
G_GDP
Indicator Freedom House Polity IV EBRD Indicator growth per capita
Variable DEM_FH DEM_POL LIB
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Freedom House; Polity IV 
Project; World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Since the formerly socialist countries started transition at different times, some authors 
have found it appropriate to deviate from calendar time (Falcetti et al. 2002; Falcetti et al. 
2005; Metelska-Szaniawska 2009). Instead, they based their periods on the respective year of 
transition start. For example, t=1 would be 1989 for Poland and Hungary, but 1992 for Russia 
or the Ukraine. Such a procedure seems appropriate especially for the early period of 
transition in order to keep track of reforms from the respective transition start on. Doing so, 
however, comes at a cost as well. Over time, the precise start of transition may not play a 
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crucial role any more. On the other hand, certain region-wide or even world-wide shocks 
cannot be taken into consideration anymore, for example by fixed period effects, without 
arbitrarily introducing dummies for specific years. Hence, using calendar time as well as 
using periods beginning with transition start have their respective advantages and drawbacks. 
So I used both for the most part of this paper. I call usual calendar-time based periods 
realtime (RT), whereas those that are based on transition start transtime (TT). 
4. Democracy and Growth in (almost) two Decades of Transition 
A first impression of the relation between democracy and prosperity in transition countries 
is given by table 2, where simple correlations between the level of gross domestic product 
(GDP_PC) and growth in per capita GDP (G_GDP) are presented. Growth is defined as the 
log difference in GDP_PC between t+1 and t. Democracy is measured by DEMit, where this 
index comes either as DEM_FHit for the Freedom House indicator or as DEM_POLit for the 
Polity indicator. The two first rows mirror the world-wide situation with respect to democracy 
and per capita GDP, namely that it is the rich countries that exhibit the highest levels of 
democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2008).  
All correlations between GDP_PC on the one hand and both the Freedom House and the 
Polity indicators are strong and significant. This is true for the real time and the transition 
time data alike. When looking at the correlation between growth and the democracy 
indicators, the picture is less clear. While only one of the non-lagged democracy indicators is 
significantly correlated with growth at all, all other correlations are insignificant. The signs 
are positive for the only significant correlation and negative for the others. The lagged 
democracy indicators for real time, however, are again both positively correlated with growth 
and strongly significant. However, their counterparts for transition time are positive but 
insignificant. So, if any, the data suggests a positive correlation between democracy and 
future growth.   
GDP_PC GDP_PC G_GDP G_GDP
RT TT RT TT
DEM_FH 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.11*** 0.04
(18.50) (18.30) (2.26) (0.67)
DEM_POL 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.05 ‐0.05
(12.94) (12.78) (0.92) (‐0.86)
DEM_FH(‐1) 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.18*** 0.03
(17.34) (17.93) (3.81) (0.60)
DEM_POL(‐1) 0.49*** 0.54*** 0.16*** ‐0.03
(12.00) (12.39) (3.31) (‐0.52)
FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime; TT: Transtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
Table 2: Correlations between democracy indicators and growth 
For a closer analysis of the relation between democracy and prosperity, I generally use the 
following es    timation equation:
 _                 ·              ·           ·          . (1) 
Here, i indicates cross sections (countries) and t periods (years),  ·     is a vector of the 
control variables, and eit is the error term. Table 3 presents the results of an ordinary least 
squares estimation without and then also with fixed country and period effects.  
Unlike what the simple correlations suggest, we find a rather negative influence of 
democracy on per capita growth in GDP whenever the coefficients are significant. Only two 
out of the respective eight non-lagged and lagged coefficients are positive, and these are 
clearly insignificant. For the real time data the non-lagged Polity indicator appears to be 
strongly significant and negative, whereas the lagged Polity indicators are positive but 
insignificant. This picture does not change upon estimating fixed country and fixed period 
effects. The non-lagged Freedom House indicator is negative and insignificant without and 
positive and insignificant with estimation of fixed effects.  
Only without fixed effects will there be a significant influence of the Freedom House 
indicator. Here it is the lagged indicator which is again negative, but only significant on the 
10 percent level. For the transition time data, the Freedom House indicator is negative and 
  15weakly significant in its lagged version but not in the non-lagged version, which is true with 
or without inclusion of fixed effects. The lagged Polity indicator is negative and weakly 
significant upon estimation of fixed effects. Without fixed effects it is the non-lagged 
indicator which is negative and weakly significant.  
 
dep. variable: G_GDP 12345678
democracy index FH POL FH POL FH POL FH POL
time RT RT RT RT TT TT TT TT
e s t i m a t i o n O L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L S
C 0.14 2.75 5.53*** 7.37***
(0.06) (1.21) (2.65) (3.50)
DEM -0.63 -1.33*** 0.13 -1.08*** 0.00 -0.83** 0.29 -0.05
(-1.62) (-4.09) (0.29) (-3.07) (-0.01) (-1.98) (0.57) (-0.13)
DEM(-1) -0.74* 0.36 -0.67 0.19 -1.05* -0.01 -0.75* -0.64*
(-1.81) (1.07) (-1.61) (0.58) (-1.93) (-0.02) (-1.67) (-1.79)
LIB 3.43*** 3.02*** 2.98*** 2.74*** 2.43*** 2.22*** 0.27 0.24
(15.94) (14.95) (5.29) (5.40) (10.15) (10.09) (0.49) (0.48)
GDP_PC -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(-3.16) (-4.21) (-5.73) (-6.63) (-2.42) (-3.25) (-4.10) (-4.46)
GOV -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.44** -0.17* -0.16
(-4.63) (-5.44) (-2.75) (-2.87) (-5.98) (-6.37) (-1.73) (-1.63)
INV -0.02 -0.03 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.04 -0.05 -0.18*** -0.18***
(-0.48) (-0.63) (-2.95) (-3.00) (-0.86) (-1.11) (-3.82) (-3.74)
fixed c. effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
fixed p. effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
p e r i o d s  i n c l . 1 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
c r o s s  s e c .  i n c l . 2 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
observations 419 419 419 419 370 370 370 370
R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.66 0.66 0.31 0.32 0.62 0.63
Adj.R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.61 0.62 0.29 0.30 0.57 0.57
F-statistic 61.73 62.66 15.41 16.04 26.66 27.85 11.50 11.72
FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime; TT: Transtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
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5
Table 3: Democracy indicators and growth 
Hence, the first regression approach suggests quite the opposite of the correlations in table 
1. If anything, democratization seems to reduce per capita growth. However, this effect is not 
fully convincing, too, which becomes particularly clear when fixed country and period effects 
are included in the estimation. Still, even then is the influence of democracy on growth 
negative, as far as there is any significant influence at all. One may attribute this tentatively 
negative effect to the fact that high income is correlated with higher levels of democracy. The 
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reason is that, within the framework of neoclassical growth theory, adjustment processes to 
new steady states imply that non-democracies, ceteris paribus, grow faster because of their 
lower initial income level. By the same token, the relatively rich democracies would naturally 
grow with lower rates. However, in our regression this effect is controlled for through the 
inclusion of the level of per capita GDP. As expected, the respective coefficients are all 
strongly significant and negative, albeit very low.  
All control variables except investment as percent of GDP (INV) have their expected signs. 
The latter are negative for all versions and in part significantly so. The degree of liberalization 
of the economy (LIB), as measured by the EBRD transition indicator, has a positive impact on 
growth and is significant in most cases, as expected. The latter result is in line with most of 
the empirical literature on that relation. 
In the above cited paper by Barro (1996), he found a hump-shaped influence of 
democratization on growth. Namely, democratization supported growth within a range of low 
initial levels of democracy, whereas it reduced growth for some higher initial levels. This 
result has been tentative but it may nevertheless be worthwhile to test such a possible relation 
for the countries under analysis here. I have done so following two standard approaches. In 
the first approach I have defined a dummy variable for high (dem_dum_hi), medium 
(dem_dum_med) and low levels (dem_dum_lo) of democracy, respectively. Since most of the 
differences in variation between Freedom House and Polity data is levelled out upon 
introduction of the dummies, I have defined dummies only for one of the indicators, namely 
the Freedom House indicator. The dummies are defined in such a way that each category 
covers one third of all data points. Since most countries have already reached relatively high 
levels of democracy after some three or four years of transition, the dummy for high levels of 
democracy captures all data points above a value of 9 and the dummy for low levels 
comprises all data points below 5.5 of the rebased data. The results are presented in the first 
two rows of table 4.   
dep. Variable: G_GDP 123456
democracy index DEM_DUM DEM_DUM FH POL FH POL
time RT TT RT RT TT TT
estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
DEM 2.45*** 1.90 1.66 2.27*
(2.62) (1.59) (1.39) (1.68)
DEM
2 -0.25*** -0.23** -0.19* -0.26**





LIB 2.41*** 0.51 2.39*** 2.54*** 0.77 0.75*
(5.20) (1.07) (4.89) (5.62) (1.61) (1.72)
GDP_PC -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(-5.27) (-3.90) (-4.62) (-6.64) (-3.05) (-4.87)
GOV -0.31*** -0.23** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.24** -0.26***
(3.12) (-2.31) (-3.22) (-2.98) (-2.45) (-2.63)
INV -0.13*** -0.09* -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.09** -0.07
(-2.74) (-1.87) (-2.76) (-2.64) (-1.97) (-1.61)
fixed c. effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
fixed p. effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
p e r i o d s  i n c l . 1 81 81 81 81 81
cross sec. incl. 25 25 25 25 25 25
observations 432 393 432 432 393 393
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67
Adj.R-squared 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62
F-statistic 15.16 13.62 15.62 15.96 13.95 14.62
FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime; TT: Transtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
8
Table 4: Dummies for democracy and non-linear effects 
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For the transition time indicators, they do indeed suggest a hump-shaped influence of 
democracy on growth, like in Barro’s (1996) paper. However, the coefficients are not 
significant, which is also the case for the real-time data. In the latter case, even the structure 
of the coefficients is not in line with a hump shape. The same is true for lagged indicators 
which I have not presented in the table. I have hence pursuit a second approach and 
introduced the democracy indicators in a linear and additionally in a quadratic form. The 
results are presented in the remaining rows of table 4. All estimations include fixed country 
and period effects. All coefficients form a humped-shaped influence of democracy on growth 
as in Barro (1996), but not all are significant. In two cases, both the linear and the quadratic 
democracy coefficients are significant and in the two remaining cases the non-quadratic 
coefficient is not significant.    19
Even if we accept a hump-shaped influence of democracy on growth for the transition 
countries, interpretation of the hum shape deserves caution. The only thing such a result 
implies is that some indicators obviously affect economic growth in a certain structure. It 
remains an open question as to what is precisely measured with these indicators. This question 
is of particular importance with respect to institutional variables like the degree of democracy. 
It seems widely accepted that both Freedom House and Polity data are good indicators for 
political freedoms as well as for the accountability of governments. However, there may be 
gross differences in the way political freedoms affect growth, depending on the widely 
differentiated institutional structure, the political ideology, and other factors for which we 
have no reliable data. However, one may argue that the results presented in tables 3 and 4 may 
be biased for at least two reasons: Firstly, the “true” level of democracy may be captured by 
the indicators only on average (at best) such that these indicators appear to be stochastic. 
Secondly, there may be repercussions between growth and democracy such that, for example, 
higher growth rates facilitate a process of democratization.  
In both cases, the right-hand variable (i.e. democracy) is correlated with the error term 
which biases the estimated coefficients. The standard approach for correcting for such a bias 
is to define an instrument variable which is strongly correlated with the right-hand variable 
but not with the error term and, for that matter, with the dependent variable. However, finding 
eligible instruments is a demanding task. It is all the more difficult in a panel-data setting like 
ours since here we need to have co-variation not only across countries but along time as well. 
Note that this co-variation has to be between the right-hand variable and the instrument but 
must not be between the instrument and the left-hand variable.  
I have tried a number of potential instruments for democracy, e.g. military spending in 
percent of GDP. However, the results of all these estimations turned out to be not plausible 
according to any criteria. The reason most probably is that military spending is not only 
(negatively) correlated with the level of democracy but that military spending also affects   20
growth rates. This applies likewise to other potential instruments as well. The underlying 
endogeneity problems may, however, be not as aggravating as they seem. They are much 
more relevant in the cross-country literature on democracy and the level of per capita income 
as compared to our relation of democracy and income growth. Since growth, as defined here, 
is the log difference in per-capita GDP from period t to t+1, the underlying time structure 
does, in principle, not allow for a causality running back from GDP to democracy. However, 
there is admittedly considerable serial correlation in the estimations presented so far.  
Hence, I have run regressions with autoregressive errors in order to reduce serial 
correlation. Additionally, I have introduced a control variable TRANSTIME for the number of 
years since the launch of transition. Also, I have estimated fixed country effects. The results 
of the AR(1) estimations are presented in table 5.  
The picture is not very clear unless the respective democracy indicator is included in a 
linear and, additionally, in a quadratic form. There is only one out of four estimations which 
delivers a significant coefficient for the democracy indicator, namely the Polity indicator for 
real time data, which is negative. The other three are also negative, but insignificant. Upon 
inclusion of DEM
2 the sign of DEM turns positive in all estimations but again, only one of 
them is significant, and only weakly so. The quadratic form of the democracy index, however, 
exhibits a somewhat clearer picture. It is negative in all cases and in three out of four 
estimations it is significant. Hence, the structure of the coefficients again supports the 
impression of a humped shape, but the linear (positive) part of the hump lacks significance in 





dep. variable: G_GDP 12345678
democracy index FH FH POL POL FH FH POL POL
time RT RT RT RT TT TT TT TT
e s t i m a t i o n A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )A R ( 1 )
DEM -0.34 2.15* -1.16*** 1.22 -0.04 1.91 -0.51 0.82
(-0.88) (1.75) (-3.67) (0.88) (0.10) (1.43) (-1.56) (0.53)
DEM
2 -0.23** -0.20* -0.17 -0.11
(-2.14) (-1.77) (-1.54) (-0.89)
LIB 2.87*** 3.02*** 2.69*** 2.65*** 1.57*** 1.59*** 1.52*** 1.49***
(5.82) (6.16) (5.83) (5.76) (2.94) (2.99) (3.00) (2.93)
GDP_PC -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(-5.71) (-4.88) (-6.21) (-6.42) (-5.42) (-4.34) (-5.64) (-5.70)
GOV -0.23** -0.25** -0.22** -0.21* -0.18* -0.18* -0.17 -0.17
(-2.04) (-2.19) (-1.99) (-1.85) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.59) (-1.60)
INV -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** -0.10* -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.19***
(-1.99) (2.04) (-2.02) (-1.87) (-3.66) (-3.60) (-3.65) (-3.52)
TRANSTIME 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.92*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 0.99*** 1.06*** 1.10***
(4.07) (4.15) (4.54) (4.87) (8.29) (4.95) (5.32) (5.40)
fixed c. effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
f i x e d  p .  e f f e c t s n on on on on on on on
p e r i o d s  i n c l . 1 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
c r o s s  s e c .  i n c l . 2 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
observations 405 405 405 405 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Adj.R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
F-statistic 24.96 24.57 26.20 25.63 21.01 20.51 21.23 20.57
FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime; TT: Transtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
Table 5: AR estimations for growth 
In order to give an impression of the dimensions, consider the second row, where both the 
coefficient of the linear and that of the quadratic democracy index are significant. The median 
value of the Freedom House democracy index in the real-time data set is 6.25 and the average 
growth rate across all countries and years is 4.1 percent. Starting with these values I have 
figured hypothetical growth rates as forecasted by the marginal effects of changes in the 
democracy index from row 2 in table 5 under ceteris-paribus assumptions. The result is 












Figure 1: Hypothetical growth rates  
According to figure 1 the highest growth rates would be realized at a pretty modest 
democracy level. Such a level is, for example, what the Ukraine had around the year 2000. 
High levels of democracy would, according to figure 1, be associated with low or even 
negative growth rates. This clearly contradicts intuition. However, the figure represents only 
the marginal effects of the respective democracy index. Its shape is not influenced by any 
other factor. Of the latter, the level of economic liberalization is clearly the most important 
factor since economic liberalization has a strong and significant influence on growth in any 
specification. Moreover, it is the democracies that embarked on the strongest liberalization 
path. Hence, economic liberalization and democratization are strongly correlated. The 
correlation coefficient between the LIB index and DEM_FH is 0.68 and that between LIB and 
DEM_POL is 0.59 in the real-time dataset (0.68 and 0.56, respectively, in the transition time 
data set) and both are strongly significant. This raises the question as to whether there is not 
just a correlation but also a causal relationship between democracy and liberalization. If this 
were the case, then it would suggest an indirect causality running from democracy to 
economic growth via economic liberalization. This is what has been suggested by Fidrmuc 
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(2003). A closer view at the relation between democratization and economic liberalization 
seems appropriate. 
5. A Closer View at Democracy and Reform Capacity in Transition Countries 
Simple Granger causality tests over two periods suggest that democracy does indeed cause 
liberalization but not vice versa. This is significant for both the Freedom House and the Polity 
indicators in real time and for the Freedom House indicator also in transition time. The test 
for  Polity data in the transition time dataset, though, suggests causality running in both 
directions. With one lag, however, causality runs in a unidirectional way from democracy to 
liberalization for both indices and for both data sets.  
I have estimated liberalization as a function of the two (one year) lagged democracy 
indices, using per capita GDP as well as the TRANSTIME dummy as control variables. All 
estimations are done with and without fixed country effects. Finally, I have again used first-
order autoregressive errors in order to eliminate serial correlation. The results are summarized 
in table 6.  
As long as fixed country effects are not estimated, both indicators are strongly significant 
but relatively low in the real time data set. Specifically, a rise in the respective democracy 
index by one point raises the liberalization index by either 0.16 (Freedom House) or by 0.09 
(Polity) points. Upon inclusion of fixed country effects, the coefficients drop to only 0.05 
(Freedom House) and 0.02 (Polity). Moreover, the latter even loses its significance. In the 
transition time setting, all but one coefficient are insignificant. Only the Freedom House index 
influences economic liberalization significantly, and only as long as fixed country effects are 





dep. variable: LIB 12345678
democracy index FH POL FH POL FH POL FH POL
time RT RT RT RT TT TT TT TT
estimation AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
C 15.80*** 14.67*** 23.46*** 235.42
(3.36) (3.50) (2.68) (0.59)
DEM(-1) 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.02 0.13*** 0.02 0.04 0.01
(6.78) (4.71) (2.23) (0.76) (4.14) (0.80) (1.31) (0.22)
GDP_PC -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(-6.65) (-6.95) (-4.76) (-4.67) (3.03) (-2.23) (-0.07) (-0.12)
TRANSTIME 1.00*** 0.96*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.64*** 3.59 0.08*** 0.08***
(8.43) (8.05) (7.19) (7.07) (-2.85) (1.32) (3.32) (3.25)
fixed c. effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
f i x e d  p .  e f f e c t s n on on on on on on on
p e r i o d s  i n c l . 1 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
c r o s s  s e c .  i n c l . 2 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
observations 425 425 425 425 373 373 373 373
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98
Adj.R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98
F-statistic 3381.22 3200.22 571.64 564.99 2496.55 2467.46 549.52 546.89
FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime; TT: Transtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
Table 6: Democracy indices and liberalization 
As far as we have a significant influence of a democracy index on the liberalization index 
we can use this relation for measuring an indirect impact of democracy on growth via 
liberalization. This is true, however, only for the Freedom House index and only in real time. 
The idea is illustrated in figure 2. Whereas past democracy impacts liberalization and, in turn, 
liberalization impacts future growth, democracy also impacts growth more directly.  
DEM(-1) LIB G_GDP
DEM  
Figure 2: Direct and indirect effects of democracy 
I this sense I have instrumented the economic liberalization index by the lagged Freedom 
House indicator in a two-step estimation and added the non-lagged Freedom House indicator 
in the second-step estimation as well. A welcomed side effect of this estimation strategy is 
that it accounts for the objection raised by Heybey and Murrell (1999) against simple   25
regressions of liberalization on growth. In their view the results will be biased because 
economic liberalization tends to be facilitated by an environment of higher growth rates, so 
that there are repercussions from growth to liberalization. In such a case, the error term will 
be correlated with a right-hand variable, in our case the liberalization index. When we now 
instrument the liberalization index by the lagged democracy index, this correlation can, in 
principle, be eliminated. Admittedly, however, this is only true as long as the lagged 
democracy index itself is not correlated with the error term. So the strategy applied here 
clearly presupposes that the non-lagged democracy index does influence growth but neither 
does the lagged indicator. The results of the two-step regression are presented in table 7.  
Democracy significantly raises the degree of economic liberalization, but again by only 0.06 
points, and economic liberalization, in turn, raises growth by 2.96 percentage points. Hence a 
rise in the past democracy index by one point would indirectly raise future growth by 0.18 
percentage point via its impact on liberalization. Additionally, we would have the direct effect 
of the non lagged democracy index on growth which is again hump shaped with the same 
coefficients as in table 5, namely 2.15 for the linear and -0.23 for the squared Freedom House 
index. Adding the 0.18 points from the indirect effect to the linear democracy index leads to 
2.33 for the linear Freedom House index which leaves the hump shape in figure 1 by and 
large as it is.  
Taken together, we find a hump-shaped influence of democratization on growth in the 
formerly socialist countries from 1989 to 2007. Additionally, we find a small influence of the 
Freedom House indicator on economic liberalization, but only in the real time data set. For 
the Polity index and in the case of the transition time data set, there can no such influence to 
be found. As far as there is a significant influence of democracy on liberalization, we can 
speak of an indirect and positive, albeit tiny impact of democracy on growth via liberalization 
on top of the hump shaped direct influence (where direct only means that we have no 
specified channels through which democracy should work itself to economic growth). All in all, we can hardly speak of democratization as a major driving force behind economic reform. 
It seems rather plausible that reform capability rests on a broader variety of institutional 
properties, some of which may well be supported by democratic structures. However, in 
reality there are clearly examples of non-democracies which successfully pursue economic 
liberalization as well. Albeit not part of the panel of this paper, China may be an illustrative 
example. 
 
1st step 2nd step




















fixed c. effects yes yes
fixed p. effects no no
periods incl. 17 17






FH: Freedom House; POL: Polity; RT: Realtime
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; t-values in paranthesis
Table 7: Two-step estimation of indirect effects 
To a certain extent, this supports the reasoning by Glaeser et al. (2004) who argue that the 
usual indices for institutional structures – in our case those caught by the EBRD-liberalization 
index – are mere policy-choice variables which can be set in a certain way by autocratic or 
democratic leaders alike. Political freedoms would then be the result of, rather than a 
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precondition for, economic growth. I would not want to go that far since such a line of 
reasoning does not answer questions as to the incentives of different types of governments to 
liberalize their economy or not. At the same time, however, the available democracy 
indicators for democracy may still be too rough in order to be able to reflect the incentive 
structures as they are incorporated in a certain political system. Still, we can say that 
democracy as such has by far not been a sufficient condition for prosperity in the formerly 
socialist countries.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have empirically investigated the relation between the degree of 
democratization, as measured by the most prominent democracy indicators, on the one hand 
and economic performance on the other hand in a set of 25 formerly socialist transition 
countries. Furthermore, I have explored the relation between democracy and economic 
liberalization in these countries as well. The results appear to be somehow disillusioning, at 
least at first glance. If any, only moderate democracy levels had a significant and positive 
effect on growth in per capita GDP whereas further democratization on top of very moderate 
levels even tended to reduce growth. This result matches the findings by Barro (1996) from a 
world-wide panel according to which the influence of democracy on growth is hump shaped. 
Since I controlled for per capita GDP, the result cannot be due to the lower initial income 
level of the non democracies. It thus requires a different explanation, most probably based on 
interacting institutional determinants. 
A further result of the paper is that the strong correlation between democratization and 
economic liberalization may give rise to a misleading impression of the true impact of 
democratization on reform capability. All coefficients are remarkably low in a regression 
which controls for per capita GDP, transition time, and fixed country effects. If any, even a   28
switch from pure dictatorship to a full-fledged democracy would raise the economic 
liberalization indicator by just 0.6 points.  
For a proponent of democracy, these results may seem disappointing. However, a 
markedly cautious interpretation seems recommended to whoever may find them to be useful 
as ammunition against political correctness. Institutional variables interact in a rather complex 
manner. In particular, political freedoms like those captured by democracy indicators may 
structure the framework within which economic activities take place in various ways when 
combined with differing institutional characteristics. It may well be the case that some of the 
evolving institutional structures may support marketization and prosperity while, at the same 
time, the citizens remain deprived of even basic political rights; and this may even work over 
a longer period of time. However, the results of this paper did not pursue to clarify whether 
such political structures can be sustainable or would, at a certain point in time, quit 
functioning unless being underpinned by political freedoms. Neither do the results tell 
anything about the role of additional institutional properties for prosperity within a period of 
marketization, such as the rule of law, the independence of courts, or the control of 
corruption.  
What the results of this paper do indeed tell, however, is that democratization alone, as 
defined in the somewhat narrow sense of our indicators, cannot be viewed as a major driving 
force behind economic liberalization and prosperity in the formerly socialist countries. Put in 
a different way, democracy was obviously less of an economic input into the economic reform 
process but more of an input into the construction of a framework for personal and political 
freedom which can now be enjoyed by the citizens in those countries which embarked on a 
thorough democratization process – no more but by far no less than that.  
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